Most models of decision-making suggest that confidence, the 'feeling of knowing' that accompanies our choices, is constructed as the decision unfolds. However, more recent studies have noted that processes occurring after we commit to a particular choice also affect this subjective belief. This leads to the following question: when are we better judges of ourselves? If, after a decision, evidence continues to accumulate in an unbiased manner, then our confidence judgements should improve. Conversely, if post-decisional information processing is biased, our sense of confidence could be distorted, and so our confidence judgements should degrade with time. We briefly discuss recently proposed models of post-decisional evidence accumulation, and explore whether, and how, biases in confidence could arise.
Introduction
Humans and other animals integrate noisy sensory input to infer the state of the world, and guide action and choice [1] . Action selection is accompanied by a 'sense of confidence', a subjective feeling about the validity of the choice [2] . Much of the psychology and neuroscience of decision making has focused on understanding the computations that underlie this subjective belief. Several different models for computing confidence have been proposed (signal detection theory [3, 4 ], sequential sampling [5] [6] [7] , Bayesian inference [8 ,9 ], heuristics [10], etc.) and they have been compared with explicit reports in humans [4 ,5,6,8 ,9 ] and with implicit estimates of confidence in non-human animals [3, 7] . Until recently, most of these models assumed that confidence is a decisional process, that is, that it is computed by the same circuitry that drives choice or, at the very least, that it is constructed during the decision. This assumption rests on a vast corpus of neurophysiological evidence in rodents [3] and monkeys [7] showing that changes in stimulus reliability (e.g., the coherence of moving dots) modulate the firing of neurons that predict both choice accuracy and confidence [11] .
In sharp contrast to this perspective, several more recent experiments have concluded that our sense of confidence is also determined by processes that occur well after we commit to a choice [12,13 ,14-16,17 ,18,19 ] . This observation leads to several questions: What are the consequences of such post-decisional processing of confidence? How does it affect the accuracy of this subjective belief? For example, should we trust our immediate (gut) feeling of confidence, or is it better to take our time and 'gain perspective'? Here, we review state-of-the-art models of confidence and explore possible answers to these questions. In particular, we focus on how post-decisional processes affect our 'metacognitive accuracy', namely, the extent to which our confidence is consistent with our probability of being correct [20] . Far from being idle curiosity, knowing when we are better judges of ourselves could benefit us in several ways: it could help us cooperate effectively [21, 22 ] and reduce aversive counterfactual thinking [23] that otherwise leads to negative emotions such as regret [24] . In addition, knowing the right time to gauge the validity of our choices is essential for minimising distortions of confidence [25] wherein confidence is no longer predictive of objective accuracy (Box 1). These include overconfidence [26] and confirmation bias [27] ; both are systematically observed in human choices, and both contribute to poor judgement and bad decisions [28] .
Biases in post-decisional processing
The most straightforward experimental evidence that subjects continue processing information after making a decision is that they often express a desire to reverse their initial choice [12, 14] . These 'changes of mind' were observed both in simple perceptual decisions [12] , and in a recognition memory task [14] , and cannot be explained by models that disregard post-decisional processing. Given that evidence continues to accumulate after a decision, it would not be surprising if confidence changed as well. And indeed, confidence sometimes depends on the length of the inter-judgement interval, that is, the amount of time between making a decision and giving a confidence rating on that decision [16] 
